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Contrary to prevalent scepticism, the right to private property transcends the protection of 
economic exchange and can be relevant to broader societal discourses. In Europe, claims based 
on the protection of private property have been made in a wide variety of contexts before the 
ECtHR and the CJEU. They range from the protection of consumers and their family homes from 
unfair mortgage terms to the subsistence and wellbeing of individual applicants and from banking 
supervision and shareholding rights to salary and pension cuts following the financial crisis. The 
core issue that cuts across these examples relates to our understanding of the right to property and 
the way in which it is shaped in diverse and complex governance structures within, and especially 
beyond, the state. In this context, the nature of the right remains elusive and riddled with a 
fundamental tension between its economic and non-economic sides.  
 
This blog post seeks to demonstrate that it is possible to depart from an antithetical and mutually 
exclusive understanding of the economic and non-economic sides of property as diverse societal 
discourses shape its transformation. Rather than manifesting irreconcilable elements, the different 
dimensions of property are mutually constitutive of the right and this is illustrated by the 
jurisprudence of international courts that contribute to its interpretation. This allows for a 
possibility of evolution and adjustment of its scope and function. Private property, in turn, can 
have a transformative impact that takes root not only in the economic but in all aspects of society. 
The arguments presented here are expanded in my article ‘In-between an Economic Freedom and 
a Human Right: A Hybrid Right to Private Property’. 
 
Considering the role of courts in this context, the CJEU and the ECtHR are good candidates for 
reflecting on the above issues, as they are the main regional judicial actors in the European legal 
space. This is especially relevant, given that they have attracted the criticism that they abstract 
property – and other rights – from its social context and interpret it on the basis of an economic 
model which focuses on the generation of profit and the objective market value of assets. This 
criticism has also been extended to the courts’ approach in the context of the financial crisis, given 
the absence of social rights from the ECHR and their relative weakness under EU law.  
 
The jurisprudence of the courts demonstrates, however, that they have been increasingly willing 
to consider the economic and non-economic dimensions of private property in distinct ways. 
Illustrative in this regard are cases relating to the nationalisation of Northern Rock (Grainger-
ECtHR), the haircut of state bonds (Accorinti-CJEU) and banking supervision (Albert-ECtHR), 
among others. Both courts have recognised that the economic nature of some forms of property 
entails significant financial risk which, by itself, may lead to partial or even total loss of the value 
of property. In this context, they have assumed that such intrinsic risks and hazards are knowingly 
undertaken by property-holders (i.e., when dealing with economic assets whose value is tied to 
market conditions, such as shares) and have elevated these aspects to relevant factors when 
evaluating the proportionality of restrictions on the right to property. The more risky and 
speculative the nature of the property in question, the more the centre of gravity lies on its 
economic characteristics. In these circumstances, the review of national measures limiting the right 
is more lenient, and therefore, economic conduct that may be socially harmful is not shielded 
behind the protection of the right to property. The policy of moral hazard and the economic 
aspects of shareholding has played a significant role in the courts’ reasoning: had the share/bond-
holders been allowed to benefit by receiving compensation, this would have encouraged bad 
business decisions by managers and shareholders in other banks on the assumption that they were 
entitled to a safety net with the availability of similar support. 
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Moreover, the courts have managed to link the economic and social dimensions in their 
interpretation of the right and to switch between the two. In this sense, they turn to the non-
economic logic of property as a way of reading social obligations into the sphere of the economy. 
This is evident when courts are asked to assess measures that concern social elements of property 
due to their impact on the subsistence or family home of the affected party (e.g., N.K.M. and 
Koufaki-ECtHR and Aziz-CJEU. In Aziz, the Court framed the dispute with reference to the 
protection of housing and the family home and brought social considerations relating to property 
within the scope of consumer law, a key area of the EU’s internal market.). By considering factors 
such as personal hardship and well-being, the courts are able to assess whether individual 
applicants have been disproportionately affected in comparison to other parts of the population 
and to ‘lighten the burden’ of those most severely affected. 
 
The point of my analysis is to move beyond a doctrinal categorisation of the right and to provide 
a broader examination of the social dynamics that bring about the transformation of property and 
drive forward its conceptualization, so that it does not remain limited to mutually exclusive 
configurations. Has, then, social theory -social systems theory in particular- any tools to offer to 
better understand the case law and analyse the right? Indeed, theory and doctrine seem to 
converge. 
 
As a classical institution of private law, property enables the participation of economic actors in 
the market, the acquisition of assets and the generation of profit. Property law, however, has 
become much more complex and multi-dimensional. It is responsive to the many rationalities of 
society and provides legal form to social institutions that are shaped by non-economic logics. 
Indeed, the law translates the economic operations of dealing with property into a set of 
permissible actions and corresponding limitations in relation to the use of economic assets. At the 
same time, it receives information from social systems other than the economy (e.g. politics), so 
that it binds economic operations and restrains economic conduct that is damaging to society. In 
this sense, it ensures the compatibility of economic forms of activities with social considerations 
emerging from other non-economic fields and therefore, limits the excessive growth of economic 
exchange that can have adverse effects. 
 
Under human rights law, the right to property does not lose its connection to economic assets and 
to the guarantee of economic action. As such, it ensures a sphere of individual freedom protected 
from arbitrary exercise of state power and can facilitate integration and participation in the market. 
Nonetheless, social considerations can be observed when restrictions on property are permitted 
in the public interest or when national measures affecting the right to property are assessed based 
on their impact on the level of subsistence and hardship of the right-holder. Property can thus 
enter into the realm of the welfare state and demonstrate affinity with its rationality.  
 
The point here is not only to illustrate the different roles of property in economic and human 
rights law contexts (see also here), but to demonstrate that the different elements are intrinsically 
linked. Property is therefore transforming from a unitary institution of private law into, what may 
be called, a hybrid construct: a hybrid right to property oscillates between its economic and social 
dimensions with the potential of managing their tensions and rendering them complementary. The 
hybridity is manifested in the reasoning of the courts and is translated into a legal formulation, 
which can integrate the different sides of property and can be projected into the debates about the 
desirability and dialectic of these sides.  
 
In this silent transformation of property lies also its transformative role. The right is presented 
with the monumental task of dealing with diverse fields of social activities and with different policy 
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and legal areas, including consumer law, pensions, unemployment benefits as well as monetary 
policy and structural economic reforms. More recently, the ECtHR even opened up the possibility 
of relying on positive obligations under Article 1-Protocol 1 in order to defend individual 
applicants against the effects of climate change (Duarte Agostinho). Managing the tensions that the 
right to property is faced with can contribute to overcoming a one-sided orientation and to fully 
capturing its role in society and the transformative impact it can have. 
 
While legal guarantees for a hybrid right to property are indispensable in safeguarding the 
spontaneity, innovation and growth-generating capacities of non-state actors, they also ensure that 
economic activities do not over-expand or damage the prospects of economic recovery, 
sustainability and inclusion in different sectors of society. The interpretation of the right in this 
way overcomes the pure incrementalism of an exclusively economic dimension of property. It acts 
as a corrective mechanism that combines the strength of internal self-organisation of the economic 
system with external strategic guidance that develops its responsiveness to the wider society.  
 
Overall, it is possible to conceptualise the protection of property as a measure for reviewing 
arbitrary political practices (as in N.K.M.), but also the compulsion of growth of other social 
systems that is manifested, for instance, in economic activities that may lead to socially harmful 
results (as in Grainger). Its transformation into a hybrid construct illustrates its inbuilt flexibility and 
capacity to oscillate between its different functions in rapidly changing societal practices at the 
transnational level. 
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